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A Crack in the Shield? Malpractice Coverage at Risk
Abstract
A recent, unreported opinion of the Minnesota Court of Appeals has opened up a major hole in the liability
shield of professional firms. Continental Casualty Co. v Duckson-Carlson, LLC, misapplies the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, misinterprets the Minnesota Professional Firms Act, ignores the fundamental distinction
between an entity and its owners, and sub silentio turns the law of third party beneficiaries on its head. From a
practical perspective, the decision should trouble every lawyer, doctor, accountant, and other "319B"
professional in the state and, moreover, has serious implications for individuals covered by D&O insurance
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A recent, unreported opinion of the Minnesota Court of Appeals has opened up a major hole in 
the liability shield of professional firms.  Continental Casualty Co. v Duckson-Carlson, LLC 
misapplies the doctrine of equitable estoppel, misinterprets the Minnesota Professional Firms Act, 
ignores the fundamental distinction between an entity and its owners, and sub silentio turns the 
law of third party beneficiaries on its head.1  From a practical perspective, the decision should 
trouble every lawyer, doctor, accountant, and other “319B” professional in the state and, 
moreover, has serious implications for individuals covered by D & O insurance.2 
The facts in the case were relatively simple.3  A professional limited liability company practicing 
as a law firm obtained malpractice insurance through a policy that included a $15,000 deductible.  
A former client of the firm brought a malpractice suit against the firm and one of its lawyers.  The 
lawyer adamantly denied any breach of duty but — recognizing the brevity of life and believing 
that he had no financial “skin in the game” — agreed to a settlement.  The malpractice carrier 
paid the settlement amount to the plaintiff, the firm became insolvent and could not pay the 
deductible, and the carrier then demanded $15,000 from the individual lawyer.  
Only then did the lawyer learn that the malpractice policy purported to make every member and 
associate of the firm jointly and severally liable for any deductible the firm failed to pay.  Not 
surprisingly, in the author’s experience of similarly situated professionals, the lawyer had never 
read the malpractice policy.  The attorney had certainly not signed the policy,4 and during the 
settlement discussions with the carrier: (1) he did not ask whether he would be personally liable 
for any portion of the settlement; and (2) the carrier did nothing to alert him to the issue. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed in a decision that makes a series of fundamental conceptual errors 
The panel’s core rationale was equitable estoppel, i.e., that the lawyer could not accept the 
benefits of the malpractice coverage and then seek to escape the deductible responsibility 
imposed by the policy: 
This case invites equitable estoppel. …  Appellant [the lawyer] intentionally took full advantage 
of respondent’s malpractice insurance coverage (why not — appellant knew that as a member of 
his firm that even though he did not personally negotiate the policy and sign off on it he was 
covered if someone sued him for malpractice — he expected that benefit from his law firm, and 
received it). Appellant knew that he was required to have malpractice insurance and that 
respondent was providing him with the required insurance so that he could practice law. Up until 
respondent sought reimbursement directly from appellant for the deductible (because [the firm] 
had been dissolved), appellant took advantage of respondent’s malpractice coverage. It is 
unequivocally safe to say that during the suit alleging malpractice appellant depended, expected, 
and relied upon respondent to provide him with his safety net of malpractice insurance. He can 
not now claim that he “was not a party” to the insurance contract, and can have its benefits but no 
responsibility for the deductible.5 
Viewed superficially, this holding might seem reasonable and could even resonate with notions of 
ratification.  But equitable estoppel presupposes some “voluntary conduct of a party [and] … 
another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to 
change his position for the worse.”6  Equitable estoppel is synonymous with “estoppel by 
misrepresentation,”7 and the attorney in Duckson-Carlson made no representations.  Nor can his 
silence during settlement discussions suffice as misrepresentation by silence.  That concept 
applies only “when one … by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through 
culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully 
relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the 
existence of such facts.”8  Why “ought” the attorney to have spoken out when he was ignorant of 
the provisions of a policy to which he was not a party?  How could an insurance carrier rightfully 
rely on the silence of a person with whom the carrier was not in privity? 
Similarly, the doctrine of ratification is initially intriguing but ultimately inapposite.9  A 
ratification analysis would: (1) view the firm as purporting to act as the lawyer’s agent when 
assenting to the policy provision that imposed the deductible obligation on the lawyer; (2) treat 
the lawyer’s acceptance of the coverage protection as affirming the firm’s act (i.e., as a 
manifestation of ratification), on the theory that a person cannot ratify only part of a deal;10 and 
(3) overcome the lawyer’s ignorance of the material fact of his purported liability by asserting the 
carrier’s reliance on the ratification.11  However, for a manifestation to constitute affirmance, the 
person ratifying must be aware that the affirmance is retroactively approving another person’s 
prior conduct in purporting to bind the ratifier.12  The lawyer in Duckson-Carlson agreed to the 
settlement having no idea that his firm had purported to act as his agent with regard to the 
deductible obligation.13 
The Court of Appeals also justified its decision in terms of the Reporter’s Notes to Minn. Stat. 
§319B.06 and the treatment there of London, Anderson Hoeft, Ltd. v. Minnesota Lawyers Mut. 
Ins. Co.14   London involved Chapter 319A, the predecessor statute to the Professional Firms 
Act.  Both sides in Duckson-Carlson sought to make use of London, and defendant-appellant’s 
position was that the law had changed: 
Appellant argues that the holding in London has been overruled by the repeal of Minn. Stat. 
§319A.10 (2004) and the enactment of Minn. Stat. §319B.06 (2004) and therefore he is not liable 
under the insurance policy. We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument. The general 
comments to Minn. Stat. §319B.06 specifically state, “[Minn. Stat. §319B.06, subd. 3] addresses 
the questions of liability ... and intends no substantive change from Minn. Stat. §319A.10.  Minn. 
Stat. Ann. §319B.06 general comm. (West 2004). The subdivision does, however, use a different 
approach in the hope of clearly producing the same result.” Id. (Emphasis added [by the court]). 
The comments specifically discuss the decision in London, explaining that the holding was a 
correct interpretation of the law. The comments further explain that “Minn. Stat. §319A.10 was 
never intended to go so far ... .” Id. It is apparent that the comments intended to add weight to the 
London holding that members of a professional corporation can not be held liable for malpractice 
if they are not personally named in the suit. The comments continue to clarify the London 
decision by explaining that a member can assume the debts of the professional corporation by 
contract “for some or all of the organization’s debts.” We interpret this statement to mean that 
each member must assume by contract personal liability for instances where they are not 
personally named in a malpractice suit. For instances where they are personally named in a 
malpractice suit, as here, no such contract is required. This interpretation will ensure that Minn. 
Stat. §319B.06, subd. 3 produces the same result as repealed Minn. Stat. §319A.10.15 
Either the Court of Appeals read the Reporter’s Notes carelessly,16 or the Notes’ drafter was not 
blunt enough.  The “same result” sought by Section 319B.06, subdiv. 3(c) was that members of 
professional firms would not by that status be liable for the debts of the firm.  The Notes 
expressly disapprove of London.  They: 
• explain that “the detailed language contained in Minn. Stat. §319A.10 has confused the 
courts on at least one occasion,” 
• name the London case as that occasion of confusion, and 
• state that “Paragraph (c) seeks to avoid confusing cases such as London … .”17 
The Reporter’s Notes recognize that “public policy does not prevent a stockholder, LLC member, 
or LLP partner from assuming by contract personal liability for some or all of the organization’s 
debts.”18  However, nothing in the Duckson-Carlson facts supports a contractual undertaking by 
the individual lawyer.  That is precisely why the Court of Appeals had to resort to its flawed 
theory of equitable estoppel. 
The Court of Appeals simply did not recognize the distinction the Professional Firms Act makes 
between the firm and its members.  Juridically, absent a piercing claim, the members and the firm 
are entirely separate.  The firm has no greater power to bind its members to an obligation than the 
author of this article has to bind the author of the Duckson-Carlson opinion.19  
Contract law helps further explicate the error of Duckson-Carlson.  The malpractice insurance 
policy referred to the firm (the policyholder) as the Named Insured,20 but in the lexicon of 
contract law the carrier is the promisor, the firm is the promisee, and the individual lawyers are 
third party beneficiaries.  In the language of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §302(a), the 
lawyers are “intended beneficiaries.”  The older label is “creditor beneficiary,” indicating that the 
carrier’s promise of coverage serves to perform an obligation that the firm has toward its 
lawyers.21  Providing the coverage was a material part of the remuneration the firm promised the 
lawyers in return for the lawyers’ services. 
It is axiomatic that a promisor’s obligation to a third party beneficiary is subject to whatever 
defenses on the contract the promisor has against the promisee.22  However, there is simply no 
authority for the notion that the promisor has an affirmative claim against and may recover from 
the third party beneficiary if, after the promisor has rendered performance to the third party 
beneficiary, the promisee renders defective performance to the promisor or otherwise defaults.23  
Put more simply, a third party beneficiary is subject to defenses and offsets due to defects in the 
promisee’s performance but is not the guarantor of that performance. 
Case law on this subject is scant, but one Missouri case is directly on point.  In Continental Cas. 
Co. v. Campbell Design Group, Inc. a professional liability carrier sought to recover a $75,000 
deductible from both the professional firm and individual defendants.  The carrier contended that, 
just as the coverage extended to the individual additional insureds, so too did the deductible 
obligation.  The Missouri Court of Appeals flatly and categorically rejected that argument: 
What is not discussed by Continental is the basic legal premise that a contract generally binds no 
one but the parties thereto, and it cannot impose any contractual obligation or liability on one not 
a party to it. The record does not establish that either of the individual defendants was a party to 
the contract.  Language in a contract to which they were not parties cannot bind them.24 
The Duckson-Carlson decision ignores this basic tenet of contract law and, as a result, threatens 
the expectations of a wide range of “additional insureds.” Not only the members and associates of 
professional firms are at risk but also by implication every contractor, subcontractor, owner, 
vendor, and lessor covered under the contractual liability provisions of a comprehensive general 
liability (CGL) policy.  The risk also extends to another classic set of third party beneficiaries — 
officers and directors covered under a D & O policy obtained by a corporation or other 
organization. 
There is nothing in public policy that prevents a malpractice carrier from requiring a firm’s 
members and associates to guarantee the firm’s deductible obligation as a condition to the 
issuance of a policy.  But such guarantees must be obtained directly, from each member and 
associate, and not through the firm’s unauthorized commitment on behalf of those who own and 
work for it.  
Fortunately, Continental Casualty Co. vs. Duckson-Carlson, LLC is an unreported decision and 
not precedential.25  Unfortunately, even an unreported decision can be influential.26  During the 
2007 legislative session, the MSBA Business Law Section may obtain corrective amendments to 
Chapter 319B (and even blunter Reporter’s Notes).  Until then, however, each lawyer in private 
practice ought to be carefully reading the malpractice insurance policy of his or her firm and 
admonishing each of the firm’s professional firm clients to do the same. 
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